Abstract. In most application areas, we need to take care of several (reasonably independent) participants. For example, in controlling economics, we must make sure that all the economic regions prosper. In controlling environment, we want to guarantee that all the geographic regions have healthy environment. In education, we want to make sure that all the students learn all the needed knowledge and skills.
In pedagogical research, the decision is usually made based on the comparison of the average grades
and
For example, we can use the t-test (see, e.g., (Sheskin, 2007) ) and conclude that the method T is better if the corresponding t-statistic
where
exceeds the appropriate threshold t α (depending on the level of confidence α with which we want to make this conclusion).
How this problem is usually solved now: limitations.
The average grade is not always the most adequate way to gauging the success of a pedagogical strategy. Whether the average grade is a good criterion or not depends on our objective. Let us illustrate this dependence on a simplified example. Suppose that after using the original teaching method T , we get the grades x 1 = 60 and x 2 = 90. The average value of these grades is E = 60 + 90 2 = 75.
Suppose that the new teaching method T leads to the grades x 1 = x 2 = 70. The average of the new grades is E = 70. Since the average grade decreases, the traditional conclusion would be that the new teaching method T is not as efficient as the original method T . However, one possible objective may be to decrease the failing rate. Usually, 70 is the lowest grade corresponding to C, and any grade below C is considered failing. In this case, − in the original teaching method, one of the two students failed, while − in the new teaching method, both students passed the class.
Thus, with respect to this objective, the new teaching method is better.
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Towards a More Adequate Solution to the Resource Distribution Problem: How to Combine Utilities of Different Participants
Need to combine utility values: reminder. We can describe the consequence of each possible action a for each participant i by his or her utility value u i (a). Thus, for n participants, each decision a is characterized by n utility values u 1 (a), . . . , u n (a). In order to compare different decisions a, we must combine these utility values u i (a) into a single value of an objective function u(a) = f (u 1 (a), . . . , u n (a)).
The meaning of this objective function is that the larger its value, the better the alternative a for the group as a whole. Thus, we should select the alternative for which this combined value u(a) is the largest.
Need to select a combination function. There are many different ways to combine the utility values.
In mathematical terms, this means that there are many different functions f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) that can be used for such a combination. Which of these functions should we choose?
How to select a combination function: a reasonable requirement. Strictly speaking, utility theory describes preferences of individuals. However, in practice, utility theory (and related game theory) also describe interaction between groups. In such a description, we describe the preferences of each group participant (corporation, city, country, etc.) by using the same utility theory approach: that the preferences of a group can be described by a utility function in such a way that the preference of an action is determined by the corresponding expected utilities. It is therefore desirable to select a combination function for which the combined function has the properties of the utility. In particular, it is natural to require that the resulting group preference has the following property:
− if two actions has the same quality for all participants, − then these two actions are equivalent for the group as well.
Towards formulating the above requirement in precise mathematical terms. Actions can lead to different possible outcomes ω. We assume that for each possible outcome ω and for each participant i, we know the utility u i (ω) that describes this participant's opinion of this outcome.
The traditional decision theory describes situations in which we know the probability of different possible outcomes. In other words, we assume that for every possible outcome ω and for every action a, we know the probability p(ω | a) of this outcome.
According to utility theory, the utility of an action a for a participant i is determined by the expected value of this participant's utility, i.e., by the value
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For example, to the participant i, the action a is equivalent to the outcome ω 0 in which
For each outcome ω, the utility of the i-th participant is u i (ω) and thus, the group utility is equal to
Thus, the utility u of the action a for the group should be equal to the expected value of the group utility:
On the other hand, for each participant i, the action a is simply equivalent to an alternative with utility E[u i ]. So, a situation in which each participant gets a reward of utility E[u i ] (with probability 1) is, for each participant, equivalent to the action a. Our requirement states that this situation should be equivalent to the action a for the group as well.
For this equivalent situation, its group utility u s can be found by applying the same combination function f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) to the deterministic utility values
Since the action a and the new situation are equivalent for the group, their group utilities must coincide. So, we must have
for every n random variables u 1 , . . . , u n .
Resulting mathematical formulation. We are looking for functions f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) for which, for all possible n random variables u i , we have
Our result. We will show that the only functions which satisfy the above property are the linear functions
for appropriate weights w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w n .
Proof. For a linear function f , the property (6) is easy to derive. Indeed, due to the properties of expected value, we have
Vice versa, let us assume that the function f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) satisfies the property (6). For simplicity, let us restrict ourselves to the case n = 2; the case n > 2 can be handled similarly. Let us show that in the case n = 2, the function is indeed linear.
Indeed, without loss of generality, let us consider values u 1 ∈ [0, 1] and u 2 ∈ [0, 1] for which u 1 ≥ u 2 . Let us consider the situation with three possible outcomes:
− an outcome ω 1 whose probability is p(ω 1 ) = u 2 ; − an outcome ω 2 whose probability is p(ω 2 ) = u 1 − u 2 ; and − an outcome ω 1 whose probability is p(ω 3 ) = 1 − u 1 .
One can easily see that
We then select the individual utility functions as follows:
− we take u 1 (ω 1 ) = 1 and u 2 (ω 1 ) = 1;
− we take u 1 (ω 2 ) = 1 and u 2 (ω 2 ) = 0; and − we take u 1 (ω 3 ) = 0 and u 2 (ω 3 ) = 0.
In this case, the expected values of individual participants are equal to:
In this situation, the group utility u(ω) = f (u 1 (ω), u 2 (ω)) is equal to:
Thus, the expected values of the group utility is equal to:
On the other hand, due to the property (6), this expected value should be equal to
So, for u 1 ≥ u 2 , the function f (u 1 , u 2 ) can indeed be described by an expression which is linear in u 1 and u 2 .
In particular, for u 1 = u 2 = 0.5, we conclude that
Similarly, we can prove that another linear expression describes the function f (u 1 , u 2 ) for the case when u 1 ≤ u 2 :
To complete our proof, we must show that these two linear expressions coincide, i.e., that the same linear expression is applicable both:
− in the case of u 1 ≥ u 2 and − in the case of u 2 ≥ u 1 .
For that, let us consider a new situation with two possible outcomes:
− an outcome ω 1 whose probability is p(ω 1 ) = 0.5, and − an outcome ω 2 whose probability is p(ω 2 ) = 0.5.
− we take u 1 (ω 1 ) = 1 and u 2 (ω 1 ) = 0, and − we take u 1 (ω 2 ) = 0 and u 2 (ω 2 ) = 1.
Thus, we conclude that
By comparing (10) and (8), we conclude that
hence
and, thus,
Substituting the expression (13) into the formula (7), we get the expression (9). Thus, the two linear formulas (7) and (9) are indeed identical. The statement is proven.
Comment. This result is similar to the result about the case when the participants are, in some reasonable sense, independent. This case has been actively analyzed in decision theory. In particular, it has been proven that the corresponding objective function can be represented as the sum of "marginal" objective functions representing different participants, i.e.,
see, e.g., (Fishburn, 1969; Fishburn, 1988) .
Towards the Optimal Effort Distribution: Constraint Optimization Problem
Formulation of the problem. Let e i (x i ) denote the amount of effort (time, etc.) that is need for i-th participant to achieve the value x i of the corresponding quantity (grade, income, etc.). It is reasonable to assume that the better effect we want to achieve, the more effort we need, so each function e i (x i ) is strictly increasing. Let u i (x i ) denote the utility of the i-th participant on achieving the value x i , and let w i denote the corresponding weight.
Let e denote the available amount of effort. In these terms, the problem of selecting the optimal teaching strategy means that we maximize the objective function under the constraint that the overall effort cannot exceed e:
under the constraint
Comment. The objective function (15) depends only on the combinations
and not on the individual values of w i and u i (x). Thus, to simplify the corresponding optimization problem, it makes sense to reformulate it in terms of the new "benefit" functions f i (x).
Similarly, the constant value w 0 is irrelevant for optimization, so we can safely ignore it. Thus, we arrive at the following simplified formulation:
under the constraint (16).
Towards solution. First we note that, due to monotonicity, if the total effort is smaller than e, then we can spend more effort and get the better value of the objective function (17). In other words, the maximum is attained when all the effort is actually used, i.e., when we have the constraint
To maximize the objective function (17) under this constraint, we can use the Lagrange multiplier method. According to this method, the maximum of the function (17) under constraint (18) is attained when for some value λ, the auxiliary function
attains its (unconstrained) maximum. Differentiating this auxiliary function with respect to x i and equating the derivatives to 0, we conclude that
where f i and e i denote the derivatives of the corresponding functions. From this formula, we can explicitly describe λ as
So, once we know λ, we can find all the corresponding grades x i -and the resulting efforts -by solving, for each i, a (non-linear) equation (21) with a single variable x i . The value λ can be found from the formula (18), i.e., from the condition that for the resulting
Need to Take Uncertainty Into Account
Assumptions: reminder. In the above text, we assumed that:
− we know exactly the benefits f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of participants achieving the levels x 1 , . . . , x n ; for example, we know the exact expressions for the benefit functions f i (x i );
− we know exactly how much effort e i (x i ) is needed to bring each participant i to a given level x i , and − we know exactly the level of x i of each participant -for example, in education, the level of knowledge x i is exactly determined by the grade.
In practice, we have uncertainty.
Average benefit function. First, we rarely know the exact benefit function f i (x i ) characterizing each individual participant. At best, we know the average function a(x) describing the average benefits of the level x to a participant.
Average effort function. Second, we rarely know the exact effort function e i (x i ) characterizing each individual participant. At best, we know the average function e(x) describing the average effort needed to bring a participant to the level x.
Interval uncertainty. Finally, the known value x i is only an approximate indication of the participant's level x i . Once we know the estimate x i , we cannot conclude that the level x i is exactly x i . At best, we know the accuracy ε i of this estimate. In this case, the actual (unknown) level x i can take any value from the interval
Under interval uncertainty, instead of a single value of the objective function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we get an interval of possible values
Fuzzy uncertainty. In many practical situations, the estimates x i come from experts. Experts often describe the inaccuracy of their estimates in terms of imprecise words from natural language, such as "approximately 0.1", etc. A natural way to formalize such words is to use special techniques developed for formalizing this type of estimates -specifically, the technique of fuzzy logic; see, e.g., (Klir and Yuan, 1995; Nguyen and Walker, 2005) . In this technique, for each possible value of x i ∈ [x i , x i ], we describe the degree µ i (x i ) to which this value is possible. For each degree of certainty α, we can determine the set of values of x i that are possible with at least this degree of certainty -the α-cut x i (α) = {x | µ i (x) ≥ α} of the original fuzzy set. Vice versa, if we know α-cuts for every α, then, for each object x, we can determine the degree of possibility that x belongs to the original fuzzy set (Dubois and Prade, 1978; Klir and Yuan, 1995; Moore and Lodwick, 2003; Nguyen and Kreinovich, 1996; Nguyen and Walker, 2005) . A fuzzy set can be thus viewed as a nested family of its (interval) α-cuts.
From the computational viewpoint, fuzzy uncertainty can be reduced to the interval one.
Once we know how to propagate interval uncertainty, then, to propagate the fuzzy uncertainty, we can consider, for each α, the fuzzy set y with the α-cuts
see, e.g., (Dubois and Prade, 1978; Klir and Yuan, 1995; Moore and Lodwick, 2003; Nguyen and Kreinovich, 1996; Nguyen and Walker, 2005) . So, from the computational viewpoint, the problem of propagating fuzzy uncertainty can be reduced to several interval propagation problems.
Because of this reduction, in the following text, we will mainly concentrate on algorithms for the interval case.
How to Take Uncertainty Into Account
Let us analyze how we can take into account these different types of uncertainties.
Average utility function: general situation. Let us first consider the case when instead of the individual benefit functions f 1 (x 1 ), . . . , f n (x n ), we only know the average function a(x). In this case, for a combination of levels x 1 , . . . , x n , the resulting value of the objective function is
Smooth utility functions. Usually, the utility function is reasonably smooth. In this case, if (hopefully) all the levels are close, we can expand the function a(x) in Taylor series around the average level, and keep only quadratic terms in this expansion. The general form of this quadratic approximation is
for some coefficients a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 . For this function, the expression (24) for the objective function takes the form
i.e., the form
E is the average (1), and M is the second sample moment:
Thus, for smooth benefit functions a(x), to estimate the utility corresponding to a given combination of levels x 1 , . . . , x n , it is not necessary to know all these n levels, it is sufficient to know the average level and the mean squared level (or, equivalently, the standard deviation of the levels).
Comment. In general, the benefit function a(x) is increasing with x i . However, it is worth mentioning that the above conclusion holds for every quadratic function a(x), not necessarily a function which is increasing for all the values x 1 , . . . , x n .
Case of interval uncertainty. Until now, we assumed that we know the exact values x 1 , . . . , x n of the participants' levels. What will happen if instead, we only know intervals [ In other words, we get the following interval [f , f ] of possible values f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of the objective function:
Comment. We mentioned that for the case of smooth (quadratic) utility function and exactly known x i , we do not need to keep all n levels -it is sufficient to keep only the first and second sample moments of these grades. A natural question is: in the case of interval uncertainty, do we need to keep n intervals, or can we use a few numbers instead? In the Appendix, we show that under interval uncertainty, in the general case, all n values are needed.
How to solve the corresponding optimization problem. To solve the resulting optimization problem, we need to know, for each participant i, the utility resulting from investing effort e in this participant. In practice, we only know this value with (interval) uncertainty. So, for each distribution of efforts, instead of a single value of the group utility, we only have an interval of possible values.
To compare such intervals, we can use Hurwicz optimism-pessimism criterion well justified in decision making (Hurwicz, 1951; Luce and Raiffa, 1989) : namely, we select a value α opt ∈ [0, 1] describing our degree of optimism, and use the value α opt · f + (1 − α opt ) · f as the objective function.
Beyond Utility-Motivated Linear Combination: On the Example of Teaching
Alternative combination rules are sometimes used. In the above text, we considered utilitymotivated linear combinations of utility functions. In practice, other combination rules f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) are also used. Let us give education-related examples of such rules.
Minimizing failure rate. The objective of minimizing the failure rate means that we minimize the number of students whose grade is below the passing threshold x 0 :
Comment. Since the general objective is to maximize the value of the objective function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we can reformulate the criterion (30) as a maximization one: namely, minimizing (30) is equivalent to maximize the number of students whose grade is above (or equal to) the passing threshold
No Child Left Behind. Other criteria are also possible. For example, the idea that no child should be left behind means, in effect, that we gauge the quality of a school by the performance of the worst student -i.e., of the student with the lowest grade min(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Thus, the corresponding objective is to maximize this lowest grade:
Explicit solution to the optimization problem: "No Child Left Behind" case. In the No Child Left Behind case, we maximize the lowest grade. For this objective function, there is also an explicit solution. Since our objective is to maximize the lowest grade, there is no sense to use the effort to get one of the student grades better than the lowest grade -because the lowest grade will not change. From the viewpoint of the objective function, it is more beneficial to use the same efforts to increase the grades of all the students at the same time -this will increase the lowest grade. In this case, the common grade x c that we can achieve can be determined from the condition (18), i.e., from the equation
Comment. A slightly more complex situation occurs when we start not at the beginning, but at the intermediate situation when some students already have some knowledge. Let us denote the starting grades by x
i . Without losing generality, let us assume that the students are sorted in the increasing order of their grades, i.e., that
n . In this case, the optimal effort distribution aimed at maximizing the lowest grade is as follows:
− first, all the efforts must go into increasing the original grade x In precise terms, the resulting optimal distribution of efforts can be described as follows. First, we find the largest value k for which all the grades x 1 , . . . , x k can be raised to the k-th original level x
k . In precise terms, this means the largest value k for which
This means that for the criterion min(x 1 , . . . , x n ), we can achieve the value x
k , but we cannot achieve the value
This value x is the optimal value of the criterion min(x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Maximizing success rate. The quality of a high school is often gauged by the number of alumni who get into prestigious schools. In terms of the grades x i , this means, crudely speaking, that we maximize the number of students whose grade exceeds the minimal entrance grade e 0 for prestigious schools:
From the mathematical viewpoint, this criterion is equivalent to minimizing the number of students whose grade is below e 0 -and is, thus, equivalent to criterion (30), with x 0 = e 0 , Best school to get in. There is a version of the above criterion which is not equivalent to (30), when the quality of a high school is gauged by the success of the best alumnus: e.g., "one of our alumni got into Harvard". In terms of the grades x i , this means, crudely speaking, that we maximize the highest of the grades max(x 1 , . . . , x n ), i.e., that we take
Explicit solution to the optimization problem: "Best School to Get In" case. If the criterion is the Best School to Get In, i.e., in terms of grades, the largest possible grade x i , then the optimal use of effort is, of course, to concentrate on a single individual and ignore the rest. Which individual to target depends on how much gain we will get. In other words, − first, for each i, we find x i for which e i (x i ) = e, and then − we choose the student with the largest value of x i as a recipient of all the efforts.
Criteria combining mean and variance. Another possible approach comes from the fact that the traditional criterion-that only takes into account the average (mean) grade E is not always adequate. The reason for inadequacy is that the mean does not provide us any information about the "spread" of the grades, i.e., the information about how much the grades deviate from the mean. This information is provided by the standard deviation σ, or, equivalently, the sample variance V = σ 2 . Thus, we arrive at criteria of the type f (E, V ). When the mean is fixed, usually, we aim for the smallest possible variation -unless we gauge a school by its best students. Similarly, when the variance is fixed, we aim for the largest possible mean.
Thus, it is reasonable to require that the objective function f (E, V ) is an increasing function of E and a decreasing function of V . In general, this range estimation problem is NP-hard already for the case f (E, V ) = −V ; see, e.g., (Kreinovich et al., 2006) . This means, crudely speaking, that unless P=NP (and most computer scientists believe that P =NP), no efficient (polynomial time) algorithm can always compute the exact range.
The maximum of the expression f (E, V ) can be found efficiently. For that, it is sufficient to consider all 2n + 2 intervals [r, r] (The proof is similar to the ones given in (Kreinovich et al., 2006) .)
For the minimum of f (E, V ), for reasonable cases, efficient algorithms are also possible. One such case is when none of the intervals [x i , x i ] is a proper subset of another one, i.e., to be more precise, when x i , x i ⊆ (x j , x j ).
In this case, a proof similar to the one from (Kreinovich et al., 2006) shows that if we sort the intervals in lexicographic order
then the minimum of f is attained at one of the combinations (x 1 , . . . , x k−1 , x k , x k+1 , . . . , x n )
for some x k ∈ [x k , x k ]. Thus, to find the minimum, it is sufficient to sort the values, and then find the smallest possible value of f (E, V ) for each of n + 1 such combinations.
